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ABSTRACT 
Economic development achieved through an authoritarian model of leadership 
allowed Singapore to become a strong state. Linkages to the West through Singapore’s 
systematic industrialization and development policies build on aspects of Singapore’s 
colonial legacy; under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, these connections powered the 
transformation of Singapore economically, socially, structurally, and technologically. On 
the other hand, Lee and his ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) consistently limited the 
speed and extent of democratic progress in Singapore, including resisting the leverage 
that the thoroughgoing connections to the West might otherwise have given reformers 
and opponents in Singapore. This thesis examines how the evolution of the political 
system of Singapore, leadership, and PAP policies influenced the democratization 
process in Singapore; it finds key continuities in this development and also examines 
the potential for democratic change. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 
1. Definition of Democracy ................................................................2 
2. Democratic Requirements and Elements .....................................3 
3. Authoritarianism and Dictatorship ..............................................6 
4. Competitive Authoritarianism ......................................................7 
 RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................8 
1. Stability of the Authoritarianism .................................................9 
2. Evaluation of Democracy ............................................................11 
 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS .............................................................13 
II. SINGAPORE FROM COLONIAL RULE TO 2004 ........................................15 
 SINGAPORE UNDER COLONIAL RULE ..........................................16 
1. First British Rule..........................................................................16 
2. Japanese Rule ...............................................................................17 
3. Second British Occupation ..........................................................18 
 SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE .......................................................20 
1. The Formation of the PAP ..........................................................21 
2. Merging with Malaysia ................................................................22 
3. Separation from Malaysia and Sovereignty ..............................24 
 THE PAP STATE ....................................................................................24 
1. Democratic Control of Military ..................................................26 
2. Civil Service ..................................................................................26 
 SOCIAL POLICY ....................................................................................27 
 THE MIDDLE-CLASS EXPANSION ...................................................28 
1. Multilingualism ............................................................................29 
2. Unified Singapore.........................................................................30 
 ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION .....................................................31 
1. City Development .........................................................................31 
2. Industrialization ...........................................................................32 
3. Managing Migrant Labor ...........................................................33 
4. The International Factor .............................................................34 
 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................35 
III. RULING MODEL AND SINGAPORE POLITICS .........................................37 
viii 
 POLITICAL SYSTEM ............................................................................37 
1. Parliamentary System .................................................................38 
2. Election System ............................................................................39 
 LEADERSHIP TRANSITION ...............................................................41 
 RULING MODEL ...................................................................................42 
1. Political Rights .............................................................................43 
2. Civil Liberties ...............................................................................44 
3. Multiracialism ..............................................................................46 
4. Protection of Minorities ...............................................................47 
 REGIME AFTER LEE KUAN YEW ....................................................48 
 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................49 
IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATION, AND CONCLUSION ..........................51 
 EVOLUTION OF AUTHORITARIANISM .........................................52 
1. Authoritarianism..........................................................................52 
2. Stable Authoritarianism ..............................................................53 
 POSSIBLE CHANGE .............................................................................54 
1. Regime Change.............................................................................55 
2. Social Change ...............................................................................55 
 DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION ...........................................................56 
1. Right to Vote .................................................................................56 
2. Political Rights of the People ......................................................57 
3. Free and Fair Elections ...............................................................58 
 RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................58 
1. International Perspective ............................................................59 
2. Internal Perspective .....................................................................60 
 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .........................61 
 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................61 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................63 




LIST OF FIGURES  
 Linkage, Organizational Power, and Regime Outcome. ..............................9 
 Competitive Authoritarianism. ..................................................................10 
 Influence of Western Linkage and Leverage in Relation to the 
Authoritarianism in Singapore. ..................................................................54 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Parliamentary Election Results of Singapore ............................................40 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ALP  average labor productivity 
CMIO Chinese, Malayan, Indian, and Others 
EDB Economic Development Board 
GDP  gross domestic product 
GRC  group member constituency 
MCA Malayan Chinese Association 
MCP Malayan Communist Party  
MIC  Malayan Indian Congress 
MNC Multi-National Companies 
NCMP Non-Constituency Member of Parliament 
NMP  Nominal Member of Parliament 
PAP  People’s Action Party 
PM Prime Minister 
SAF  Singapore Armed Forces 
MP  Member of Parliament 
SDP Singapore Democratic Party 
SMC  Single Member Constituency  
SPH Singapore Press Holdings 
UMNO  United Malayan National Organization 
WP Worker’s Party 
  
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Special thanks go to my wife, Ayesha, daughter, Ishini, and son, Chethiya, for 
their mindful support extended to me throughout the thesis process. Their words 
of encouragement sincerely inspired me every moment. I take this opportunity to extend 
my special thanks for my mother and father, who are always encouraging me with 
my studies—I wish them a long life. Other than the lord Buddha, I believe my wife was 
the strongest pillar of my success. Her words of encouragement and positive thoughts 
always motivated me to continue to finish this thesis.  
I would like to acknowledge the many people who have supported me in numerous 
ways for me to achieve my success. First, my thesis advisors—Dr. Carolyn Halladay and 
Dr. Shannon Brown—were the most vital pillars of my academic success and of this thesis. 
Both of you are excellent professionals and intellectuals who guided me to find the correct 
materials and present it in a logical way. In addition, the Graduate Writing Center coaches 
became my other pillar of success. I had to read more than 25 books and an almost equal 
number of articles to acquire the knowledge to write this thesis. The English language 
was never challenging with the assistance of Marianne Taflinger, Alison 
Scharmota, and Cheryldee Huddleston. I was able to convert my thoughts into academic 
writing because of them. Alison Scharmota’s language talents and supporting efforts 
are immense, as sometimes she worked overtime when I was running behind; her 
kindness is appreciated. Special thanks to Dudley Knox Library and its staff for 
excellent service and support extended toward me during the entire thesis writing 
process. I would also like to thank the Thesis Processing Office and international editor 
for their support.  
Finally, I would like to pay special thanks to my academic advisor, Dr. 
Carolyn Halladay, for assistance extended beyond these limits. Special thanks to the 
Department of National Security Affairs for providing me with the necessary facilities 
and knowledge as well as the Naval Postgraduate School, for providing an excellent 
learning and teaching environment for me to acquire a broader spectrum of knowledge to 
complete my master’s degree.  
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Colonial legacies and economic stability have made democratization in Singapore 
possible, but government leadership and control have kept Singapore as an authoritarian 
state. Although British colonialism imparted limited democratic institutions to 
Singapore—the election office, the courts, and the taxing office—political leadership and 
People’s Action Party (PAP) policy have limited rather than expanded these institutions. 
Singapore’s first exposure to “Western linkage” came as a colonial legacy from British 
rule. In fact, Western linkage and leverage1 were two variables that helped to convert 
Singapore to an economically strong country and were most likely influencing factors for 
the state’s democratization process. The PAP became the only political party dominating 
Singaporean politics since independence in 1957, and Lee Quan Yew was its founding 
leader. Yet, Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership as Singapore’s first prime minister and the PAP 
policy hindered Western linkage and leverage and sustained a non-democratic governing 
pattern that allowed Lee and the PAP to remain in power.  
This study assesses the history of Singapore from 1965 to 2004; specifically, it 
examines the practices of the People’s Action Party and its leadership to compare the 
theoretical democratic institutions to the practical authoritarian governing behavior. The 
PAP has been the ruling party since Singapore and Malaysia jointly earned independence 
from Great Britain in 1957.2 Initially, PAP came to power through a democratic process, 
but adoption of authoritarian tendencies allowed the party to maintain its power. Singapore 
became a “strong state” due to its economic development;3 moreover, the rapid and strong 
                                                 
1 The Western linkage and leverage model is explained under the research design section of this 
chapter; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold 
War (Problems of International Politics) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.  
2 “Mr. LEE Kuan Yew,” Prime Minister’s Office of Singapore, last modified January 16, 2017, 
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/past-prime-minister/mr-lee-kuan-yew. 
3 Dan Slater, “Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore,” Journal of Democracy 23, 
no. 2 (2012): 19–21, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0021. In this article, Slater explains how Singapore is 
democratizing. Therefore, this study assumes that Singapore is democratizing. Although Singapore has not 
always shown the features of democratic transition since independence, for this study, it is assumed that 
Singapore has had some democratic features of government at some points in its history. 
2 
economic development of Singapore has allowed it to maintain political stability. As the 
first prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew relied on different models of authoritarian 
rule to ensure the prosperous, peaceful, and stable society to which he aspired for the 
country.4 Throughout his decades in office, he also managed to avoid coups or the 
militarization of the political realm in Singapore. Of all the former British colonies in the 
region, however, Singapore remains one of the few states that have not fully democratized 
since independence; it remains a non-democratic state.  
 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis asks: How have Western linkage and leverage affected Singapore’s 
political evolution, and what were the influencing factors limiting the democratization 
process in Singapore from 1957 to 2004? 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study begins by exploring the continuum of political regimes, from democracy 
to stable authoritarianism, on the basis of Western linkage and leverage. Readings offer 
several definitions and explanations for democracy, which vary by societies and regions. 
Comparing the definitions of democracy and competitive authoritarianism to the political 
status quo of Singapore provides the theoretical background for this thesis. Furthermore, 
the study evaluates in-depth existing democratic elements of Singapore in relation to 
selected criteria from the various theories.  
1. Definition of Democracy 
Several academic definitions exist for democracy; therefore, a comparison of the 
most commonly used definitions in academic literature can assist in the selection of the 
most suitable definition for this thesis. Both Dorothy Maud Pickles and Bernard R. Crick 
explain that democracy is one of the most difficult forms of political systems to define and 
has no agreed-on definition. No government in the world could constantly provide or 
                                                 
4 Gordon P. Means explains how Singapore differs from authoritarian rule and how it has become a 
model of soft authoritarianism. Gordon P. Means, “Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore,” 
Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (1996): 105–106, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0065. 
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exercise a permanent level of democratic conditions at all times and under all conditions.5 
Pickles explains that several factors and conditions influence such changes in democracy: 
“age, sex, literacy, property, social status and sometimes color and religion.” This swirl of 
influences creates different levels of democracy among societies and people.6 Crick 
suggests that democracy really refers to liberty in which laws must be enacted to secure 
individual rights from the state.7 Many authors argue that in modern democracy only a 
limited number of people often dominated by a handful of influential families, participate 
in politics. Therefore, democracy may be considered several things, according to Crick: it 
is a “system of government” representing a set of institutions for things like “universal 
suffrage, political parties, and uncorrupt elections, etc.,” and it is also a “way of life”—a 
“philosophical and moral approach”—to facilitate actual democracy for the people.8 
Hence, the term refers to people’s freedom and the individual’s freedom to make political 
choices, which are key factors in a democracy.  
2. Democratic Requirements and Elements 
The measurement of a country’s democracy assesses several minimal requirements. 
It is necessary, therefore, to select the most common measurement and criteria before 
conducting a survey of Singapore’s democracy. To form a set of minimum requirements 
for a democracy, this study began by comparing the theories of Robert A. Dahl, Venelin 
Tsachevsky, and Charles Tilly. Dahl says that the democratic unit—the controlling body 
of a city or state—does not always fit within the framework of the theory.9 Nevertheless, 
he identifies several distinct criteria, such as “elected officials; free, fair, and frequent 
elections; freedom of expression; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship,”10 as 
                                                 
5 Dorothy Maud Pickles, Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 1–28. 
6 Pickles, Democracy, 1–3. 
7 Bernard R. Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, England: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2007), 14–24. 
8 Crick, Democracy, 14–24. 
9 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 207–
208. 
10 Robert A. Dahl, 85. 
4 
requirements for a democracy. Tilly argues about the criteria set by Dahl and identifies two 
drawbacks in their application.11 First, he argues that Dahl has presented a set of 
democratic institutions, but they are not a constant measurement against which to compare 
all democracies. Tilly states that Dahl’s requirements relate mostly to developing countries 
rather than developed countries such as Canada and the United States. Second, Tilly argues 
some of the requirements listed by Dahl overlap with each other, such as freedom of 
expression and associational autonomy.12  
This thesis emphasizes that Dahl’s study had been conducted mainly targeting 
Southeast Asian countries; therefore, it suits the Singapore scenario. Hence, in the case of 
developed democracies, some of the Dahl’s requirements can be collapsed into fewer, 
broader elements as Tilly argues. In the case of Singapore and other developing countries, 
though, Dahl’s requirements facilitate better analysis of democratization. 
The comparison of Tilly’s four different dimensions—the broad, equal, protected, 
and mutually binding—to measure the degree of political relationship between the state 
and its citizens provides a scope to measure the democracy.13 The term broad explains the 
small segment of the population enjoying the broad spectrum of rights while the majority 
of the people are neglected. Second, equal refers to the measurement of equality among or 
within the different segments of the citizenry. Third, protection considers how much 
protection the people have from the state’s arbitrary actions. Lastly, mutually binding 
explains to what degree a state is obliged to provide benefits without being manipulated by 
the state officials.14 It should be noted that almost all these dimensions explained by Tilly 
also fall within one of the democratic elements of Dahl’s definition. Therefore, this thesis 
considers that the equal right to vote, the political right to vote, free and fair elections, the 
right to expression, and protection are the best criteria for the democratic survey and 
assessment in this thesis.  
                                                 
11 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1–24. 
12 Tilly, 11. 
13 Tilly, 14–15. 
14 Tilly,. 
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Tsachevsky introduces the “Swiss Model,” stating that Switzerland is one of the 
best “political system[s] of governance” for a democracy.15 He says that the main 
characteristics of the “Swiss Model” are “referendum and neutrality.”16 Switzerland had 
24 referenda during 2001–201417 and maintained its status as an armed neutral state in the 
heart of Europe.18 The model does not undermine the other common principles: “Political 
pluralism, the rule of law, observance of the fundamental human rights and liberties, 
separation of powers, viable civil society—as explained by Dahl.”19 Further, Tsachevsky 
says that any solution of democratic governments does not produce cost and gains, but 
there should be a quantitative judgement.20 Examples of things that can be quantitatively 
evaluated are the cost and gains for communication, negotiation, administrative and 
economic efficiency, etc. In Switzerland, the government serves the people but the 
democratic process does not aim to achieve economic or political gains. Under the principle 
of fundamental rights, Dahl explains that media freedom must be protected.21 Similarly, 
according to Joseph Alois Schumpeter, every person has a right to know what is happening 
in his country under the “right to information.”22 A majority of Dahl’s elements combined 
with some of Tilly’s will constitute the evaluation of Singapore’s Democracy. 
                                                 
15 Venelin T︠sachevsky, The Swiss Model: The Power of Democracy (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: 
Peter Lang, 2014), 59–147. 
16 T︠sachevski, 59–147. 
17 T︠Ssachevski, 105–108. 
18 Neils O. Buechi argues,”Switzerland’s understanding of neutrality outlaws any participation in 
security or defense alliances during peacetime or war. Thus, neutrality in Swiss history has necessitated an 
autonomous security and defense policy and, hence, relatively strong armed forces.” Neils O. Buechi, “The 
Future of Swiss Foreign and Security Policy: Increasing International Cooperation Is the Key to National 
Autonomy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, 2011), https://calhoun.nps.edu/
bitstream/handle/10945/10749/11Dec_Buechi.pdf?Sequence=1&isAllowed=y; T︠sachevski, The Swiss 
Model, 149–161. 
19 T︠sachevski, 11–15. 
20 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1994), 1–15. 
21 Schumpeter, 1–15. 
22 Schumpeter, 253–254, 262. 
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3. Authoritarianism and Dictatorship 
Milan W. Svolik and Juan J. Linz have both argued that “anti-democracy” is most 
common feature of governance by authoritarian rulers and dictators. Svolik asserts that 
authoritarian governments might have legislatures, parties, and elections; such regimes can 
be poor or rich, under military or civilian rule, and can last for days or decades.23 
Dictatorship or authoritarianism comes in response to challenges within the state and in 
politics. Svolik states that politics of this nature within a dictatorship create a form of rule, 
which is identified as authoritarian politics. Authoritarian rule is possible in most countries 
and takes various forms according to the country and its politics. Svolik explains that 
authoritarian politics is “always a ruthless and treacherous business.”24 The explanations 
given by both Linz and Svolik have similarities in their definitions. The authoritarian 
regime consists of a single ruler: a single person—the dictator—or a political party or 
Junta.25 Linz adds that the government, at the expense of the needs of the people and 
society, mainly holds the political authority. To be sure, Tsachevsky insists this form of 
government is “dying in bed,”26 although it seems to be pretty sprightly in Southeast Asia. 
Unlike a dictatorship, which can happen overnight, a stable authoritarian regime takes time 
to establish.27 To survive, regimes that develop stable authoritarian politics need long-term 
relationships with their bureaucracies.  
Authoritarian regimes always seek strong central power, allowing less political 
freedom for the people. In other words, a centralized authority, rather than a single person, 
holds the institution’s decision-making authority.28 As Andrew J. MacIntyre points out, 
                                                 
23 Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 19–20. 
24 Svolik, 13. 
25 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2009), 159–171 ; 
Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 13–17. 
26 Tsachevsky, The Swiss Model, 13. 
27 Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 47–52. 
28 Andrew J. MacIntyre, The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 1–16. 
7 
this issue is one of the most important existing contemporary issues of Southeast Asian 
politics.29 For his analysis, however, he focuses on Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and a 
few other states rather than Singapore. He says Malaysia is a country that has the least 
dispersion of decision-making power within the state system. Chan Heng Chee and Jason 
Lim et al. have developed almost similar arguments on the Southeast Asian political 
models, noting how Malaysia and Singapore have both achieved one-party dominance 
since their independence.30  
4. Competitive Authoritarianism 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are mainly civilian regimes that enjoy supreme 
political power while having democratic institutions. The tendency of these governments 
is to use officials and bureaucrats to their advantage.31 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
further argue that those governments enforce their power to suppress opposition and remain 
in power; such regimes always take advantage of the democratic institutions to justify their 
action.32 The political competition created is theoretically within the democratic 
framework but not practically fair to opponents or people. All of these features work to 
equate “competitive authoritarianism” with a hybrid regime as explained by different 
authors.33 Hence, those regimes are consistent with the features of democratic and 
authoritarian types. The elections, civil liberties, and media freedom are manipulated in an 
unfair manner so that opponents are not encountering the fair playing fields on which to 
contest or oppose such regimes.34  
                                                 
29 MacIntyre, 1–16. 
30 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978); Jason Lim, Terence Lee, and Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Singapore: 
Negotiating State and Society, 1965–2015 (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2016). 
31 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5. 
32 If a regime is in between the democracy and stable authoritarianism then it makes competitive 
authoritarianism or some time semi-democracy and liberal democracy as define by the other democratic 
intellectuals such as Linz and Tilly. Levitsky and Way, 5–6. 
33 Levitsky and Way, 5. 
34 Levitsky and Way, 10. 
8 
The features of competitive authoritarian regimes are the systematic violation of 
authority, the seeking of supreme power, the taking control of the legal sector, and the full 
control of access to resources.35 In this scenario, the most likely option available to convert 
the regime to a democracy is an external influence. Those influences are created through 
Western linkage and leverage—pressure of the Western democracies—and are developed 
over the period of time.  
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Application of Levitsky and Way’s theory of how authoritarianism can give way to 
democracy due to Western linkage and leverage forms the main part of the research design. 
Figure 1 is a dynamic representation of competitive authoritarianism that shows the 
relationship of democracy, unstable authoritarianism, and stable authoritarianism under the 
influence of Western linkage and leverage.  
                                                 
35 Levitsky and Way, 7–13. 
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 Linkage, Organizational Power, and Regime Outcome.36  
1. Stability of the Authoritarianism 
If a country has a high degree of Western linkage (i.e., a strong relationship with 
Western powers) then it will likely democratize, but if the linkage is low where the 
domestic organizational power increases then the country will convert to stable 
authoritarianism.37 If the country’s organizational power decreases and Western leverage 
(i.e., influence) is significant, then the country converts to unstable authoritarianism, which 
is favorable for democracy again. Linkage and leverage are referential variables contingent 
on the organizational power or stability of the regime. Therefore, Levitsky and Way’s 
concept depicted in Figure 1 can be explained in a linear form as shown in Figure 2.  
                                                 
36 Source: Levitsky and Way, 72. 

















 Competitive Authoritarianism.38  
Competitive authoritarianism exists on the continuum between democracy and 
stable authoritarianism. Specifically, the area from the midway point to stable 
authoritarianism is unstable authoritarianism while unstable democracy is located in the 
opposite direction from the midway point within the range of competitive authoritarianism. 
The following paragraphs consider the relationship between Western linkage and leverage 
and where competitive authoritarian regimes fall within this continuum. 
a. Western Linkage 
Western linkage has positive and negative effects for regimes. On the positive side, 
linkage can develop to enhance a country’s relationship with Western powers and increase 
the flow of Western investments. The negative effect of the Western linkage, by contrast, 
can threaten traditional society very quickly. As the economy improves due to Western 
linkage, it may encourage continued investment in a country and promote the flow of trade, 
but it may also encourage the flow of migrants into the state. There are multiple examples 
of colonial legacies coupling with western linkage to influence the course of 
democratization in independent countries, including the 1994 intervention in Haiti.39  
b. Western Leverage  
The regime’s vulnerability to external actors for democratization is explained under 
the rubric of Western linkage. There are three areas in which a regime gets vulnerable: size 
and strength of the economy and state power; Western foreign policy objectives and 
                                                 
38 Adapted from Levitsky and Way, 72. 
39 Levitsky and Way, 46–48. 
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countries’ bargaining power; and the possibility of seeking the assistance of counter-
hegemonic powers.40 If the economy of a country is stable and if it can sustain economic 
progress on its own—from the availability of raw materials and technology—then it can 
withstand Western leverage. A good example is Russia or China, as in each case, state 
power is high and the economy is largely invulnerable to Western leverage.  
Second, a country can resist Western leverage if that country has its own bargaining 
power such as having vital resources within the country. For example, Western powers can 
exert only moderate pressure on major energy producers. The last variable is aligning with 
hegemonic powers like China or Russia against Western leverage; in such situations, 
Western influence becomes minimal. Cameroon and Gabon, for example, supported by 
France and Russia have lent support to Belarus.41 Therefore, Western leverage is one of 
the most important factors influencing the democratization process in any country. 
2. Evaluation of Democracy 
Out of all the available measurements for democratization, the following five set 
up the analytical framework for this thesis. 
The equal right to vote is the most important factor by which to evaluate a 
democracy. Dahl says the domain and scope of a democracy can be clearly identified by 
the right to vote.42 For a state to become a democracy, it has to have a boundary to 
determine its citizens. Similar to Dahl, Tilly emphasizes “voting equality” or the “equal 
and effective opportunity to vote,”43 which ensures that every person of age in the country 
should be able to vote to create a democratic government. This is the first right of a 
democratic nation.  
The political rights of the people refers to the provision securing the political 
rights of the people. First, citizens have a right to hold office. Political freedom does not 
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refer to the needs of the people but the rights of the people. Furthermore, there should be 
free competition for leadership—”free competition for free vote.”44 Tilly’s “breadth and 
equity”45 features also provide a broader explanation of political rights, in other words, 
“the rights of the people.” The literature explains that a country needs more than one 
political party to become a democracy; it should have a minimum of two parties. 
Nevertheless, it should not have too many parties, because either having too few or too 
many political parties can threaten democracy. Second, political rights should be 
secured.46 The people should have the right to form political parties or join with them at 
their own choice under any political ideology. The people’s willingness to be represented 
by a political party, in turn, fulfills one of the democratic requirements of equal 
representation.47 Depending on the circumstances, politically appointed leaders receive 
different levels of decision-making authority on behalf of the people. The people, however, 
may be willing to be involved in the decision-making process even after delegating full 
control.  
The preservation of free and fair elections is one of the important requirements of 
a democratic government. Tilly explains that a democracy cannot exist if the “state lacks 
the capacity to establish a system and procedure to function free and fair election and put 
it to practice.”48 Dahl’s explanation also has similarities with Tilly; Dahl states that people 
should also be able to remove elected officials under the free and fair election process.49 
Furthermore, he argues that people should be free to decide who should take decisions and 
governments should treat all citizens with equal fairness, including the elected members. 
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The election process and voting reflects the level of democracy.50 Moreover, Tilly says 
that election results provide a parameter by which to measure democracy.51 
The right to expression provides every citizen the freedom to exchange his/her 
ideas and contribute equally within a given boundary—abiding by a legal framework or 
interstate agreements. Schumpeter states, “Consensus among the persons whose interests 
are significantly affected will be higher than it would be with any other feasible 
boundaries.”52 Dahl also states that this criterion reasserts the value of personal freedom. 
The freedom and self-determination of people are compulsory requirements within a given 
boundary. Dahl’s explanation covers both equal rights and the freedom of expression 
together.  
The protection that Tilly talks about is another important factor, though Dahl and 
Schumpeter never discuss this factor under democratic elements. The term “protection” 
refers to the mechanism to protect citizens from discrimination and abuse by the 
government in power.53 Often political conflicts over a period create a situation of political 
discrimination. Much of the literature reviewed for this study found this as one of the 
features of authoritarianism. The lack of a legal framework and the existence of a 
moderately resistant political decision-making environment are signs of arbitrary actions 
by an authoritarian government.54 Linz further says that in the absence of democracy, 
governments tends to punish personal enemies and, in the presence of a biased bureaucracy, 
will give undue rewards to their friends.  
 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter has introduced the context, 
reviewed relevant literature, and presented the research design. Chapter II offers a 
comprehensive history of Singapore’s colonial heritage, its independence, and its 
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economic, social, and political evolution under the influence of Western linkage and 
leverage. Chapter III examines the democratic promise within Singapore politics and its 
conversion from an authoritarian ruling model to a stable authoritarian model. Furthermore, 
the chapter explains the behavior and actions of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP government 
and their authoritarian ruling model. Chapter IV analyzes Singapore’s governing model to 
determine how democratic institutions have survived within authoritarianism and provides 
recommendations on how Singapore can be democratized under the influence of Western 
linkage and leverage. Thereafter, the chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis.  
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II. SINGAPORE FROM COLONIAL RULE TO 2004 
Western linkage and leverage encouraged Singapore politics to be within the 
framework of democratization in many respects. British colonial rule in Singapore helped 
establish some democratic features like the election office and the first political party 
formed during the so-called second British colonial period following World War II. These 
features have been vital throughout Singapore’s modern history, enabling Singapore’s 
ruling model to remain open for democratization. After independence in 1957, the PAP 
regime retained its status as the single most powerful political party, with no challenging 
opposition. The regime drove the entire nation toward economic success using its 
overweening power in parliament and politics more broadly. This chapter explains how 
Singapore’s colonial history and its journey to independence created certain economic and 
social changes that made Singapore amenable to Western linkage and leverage. Ultimately, 
these critical factors encouragedand are still encouragingthe democratization process 
in Singapore. 
The PAP formed democratically in 1954, and it dominated Singaporean politics 
through the support of the Chinese elites and economic progress. The majority of the 
members of the PAP were Chinese-educated settlers of the Malayan peninsula. The 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) represented the Singapore Chinese at the Federal 
Assembly of Malaysia when both countries gained independence from British rule.55 With 
the necessary political and administrative support from the MCA, the PAP was able to 
establish itself within Singapore, but later the two parties split. Nonetheless, the PAP had 
initiated its characteristic vison and a plan for the economic development when the split 
happened in 1965. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, PAP party policies became vital 
in Singapore’s achieving strong economic progress. The PAP’s winning super majority in 
the 1969 elections also became one reason to establish a strong government with a firm 
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start. PAP had no options other than driving the country toward the people’s expectations—
at least at the start. This chapter traces the rise and development of the PAP, with an 
emphasis on its democratic potential. 
 SINGAPORE UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
Singapore had two major colonial rulers—Britain and Japan—during three colonial 
periods; British rule introduced most vital democratic elements to Singapore. Crown rule 
established of several democratic institutions and features, such as the election office, a 
political party, and voting rights, in Singapore. Both periods of British rule (1819–1941 
and 1945–1957)56 introduced several multinational industries to Singapore’s 
manufacturing sector, making Singapore more commercialized. In this way, British rule 
provided a constructive jump-start to the Singapore economy, while the short-lived 
Japanese rule (1941–1945) was destructive and ruthless. Ultimately, colonial rule helped 
to establish economic progress and some democratic features in Singapore.  
1. First British Rule 
The conditions created by the British rule enticed Western investors to initiate 
business and modernize education in Singapore, which enabled Singapore to maintain 
economic progress. In 1819, the British East Indian Company landed on the shores of 
Singapore and established Singapore as a trading post,57 one of the foundational 
opportunities for Singapore to build its economy competitively in the region. Western 
multinational enterprises began manufacturing electrical goods, cables, and telephones in 
Singapore, which became some of Singapore’s leading exports in 1930.58 Two United 
Kingdom manufacturers, three engineering companies, and one major Western planning 
and construction company mainly held this manufacturing market in Singapore.59 
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Moreover, the colonial rulers introduced educational institutions in Singapore, to which 
most of the elites sent their children.60 Over the course of a century the British established 
more schools, modernized existing schools, and provided scholarships for secondary 
English-language schools. These advancements in industry and education constituted 
significant Western linkages to Singaporean society, enabling the country to navigate and 
negotiate in Western-dominated economies. 
2. Japanese Rule 
The educational, social, and economic progress set in motion by the British slowed 
or regressed under Japanese rule. The brutal Japanese occupation of Singapore from 1941 
to1945 suppressed the elite Chinese population and, by extension, Singaporean society as 
whole.61 The Japanese response to the Chinese population in Singapore, more so than to 
other ethnicities, was particularly brutal because the occupiers had historical rivalries with 
the Chinese. The Malayans in Singapore fared relatively better under the Japanese colonial 
administration.62 On the other hand, the Japanese occupation in Asia dismantled the 
imperialism marked by colonial rule and sea power.63 Japanization became a threat to 
British colonial powers and their elites in Singapore. Hence, Western firms that produced 
the majority of manufacturing products in Singapore were disrupted by Japanese rule and 
became less economically progressive in relation to the pre-WWII environment.64 The 
Japanese also forced all schools to teach in the Japanese language, instead of teaching in 
Chinese and English, which had been established under the British rule.65 The suppression 
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and language policy implemented by the Japanese compelled Singaporeans to form a 
“unified anti-Japanese military force” to resist Japanese pressure during their rule.  
3. Second British Occupation 
In 1945, Britain regained control of Singapore, and restored and expanded the 
Singaporean educational system and social conditions after WWII.66 For instance, the six-
year primary education system, introduced during the first period of British colonial rule 
was broadened to a ten-year system.67 The British changed the official language in all the 
schools to any language preferred by the parents.68 Furthermore, the United Malayan 
National Organization was formed in 1946 as an alliance of the Malayan Union, Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP)—the Malay Chinese voter base—and Malayan Indian Congress 
(MIC)—the Malay Indian voter base—to function as one political party within the 
Malaysian peninsula.69 The MCP was operating in both Malaysia and Singapore and its 
central committee headquarters was located in Singapore.70 In 1947, the economy had 
been reestablished and recovered rapidly; in 1949, the British had also reinstated trade and 
social services, as well as taking all necessary steps to maintain ethnic harmony among 
Chinese, Indians, and Malayans, which had been disturbed under Japanese colonial rule.71  
c. British Military Administration 
The British military administration’s form of control after WWII motivated 
Singapore to form its own political party. At the end of WWII, the British military 
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administration took control over Singapore and was able to restore several basic needs—
gas, water, and electricity—to society.72 The military administration, however, could not 
fully comply as society expected, and the administration became more corrupt. Its 
leadership’s collaboration with Japanese profiteers to reap financial gains led to unpopular 
control with mismanagement and inefficiency. In protesting against British military rule, 
the Malayan Union rallied more than 60 trade unions and initiated trade actions against the 
rule.73 The British military administration withdrew from Singapore in 1946, and 
Singapore became an independently governed colony under the British crown.74  
d. Political Innovation 
The separation of Singapore from Malaysia under British rule paved the way for 
the creation of both the independent political party and the election system within 
Singapore. British colonial rule separated Singapore and Malaysia into two independent 
administrative bodies, both under crown control in 1945; therefore, Singapore had to form 
its first indigenous political party as a constituent segment under the Malayan Democratic 
Union (MDU).75 The British accepted the MCP, however, which was founded in 1930 as 
a political party to quiet popular resistance.76 In 1946, the MDU opted to form a multi-
ethnic alliance party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to accommodate 
Malay, Chinese, and Indian ethnicities under one political umbrella.77 Thereafter, the 
UMNO demanded the creation of a Malayan Federation as one political system for 
Singapore and Malaysia, to which the colonial rule acceded. In 1948, however, Singapore 
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formed its first labor party and held its first general election as an independent colony.78 
Furthermore, British rulers created the moderate Progressive Party in Singapore and held 
Singapore’s first-ever municipal election in 1949.79 The formation of these political parties 
resulted in the creation of new political and election systems in Singapore during the 
second period of British colonial rule. 
e. Beginnings of Political Administration and Economic Progress 
The reconstruction of Singapore’s political administration and the reestablishment 
of economic linkages with the West were significant results of post-WWII British 
control.80 The establishment of its first political party in 1945—the Malayan Democratic 
Party—under Malaysian politics became the cornerstone of Singapore politics.81 This start 
helped Singapore to establish its own civilian administration system within Singapore 
under the supervision of British rule. Singapore’s economic development after WWII 
continued thanks to the preexisting linkages to the Western economy, and expanded with 
the trade of rubber and petroleum.82 From 1950 onward, Western linkage took the lead in 
Singapore industry by strengthening economic progress, which showed annual 
development and saw new enterprises joining annually.83 Although Japan’s brief yet brutal 
rule caused Singapore to regress, the two periods of British colonial rule established 
economic, political, and social linkages to Western democratic powers, on which 
Singapore eventually built its own independence.  
 SINGAPORE’S INDEPENDENCE 
Singapore had been able to form a political party, the PAP, to represent its own 
population, just one year before gaining independence. Singapore, however, did not receive 
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its constitutional independence from the British Crown until 1963. Singapore and Malaysia 
had a long-standing bond from sharing resources and developing linkages with the Chinese 
elites of both countries, which became a key contributory factor for the Singapore-Malaysia 
merger. Finally, the separation of the merger in 1965 allowed the PAP to emerge as a self-
standing regime responsible for finding customized solutions for Singapore’s economic 
development.  
1. The Formation of the PAP 
The official inauguration of the People’s Action Party took place in 1954 with 1,500 
members.84 By this time, Singaporean politics were establishing a left-wing party that 
could lobby all the unions to protest against British rule. The formative objectives of the 
PAP were successful; 90 percent of the trade unionists joined with them during the 
inaugural ceremony.85 The majority of PAP members, as well as its leader Lee Kuan Yew, 
were educated Chinese elites who were pro-communist and anti-colonist.86 The PAP 
proposed a united campaign with the Malaysians against British colonial rule to jointly 
receive independence for both Malaysia and Singapore in 1957.87 Singapore was always 
comfortable to work with Malaysia due to both countries’ long-standing economic links 
with Chinese elites. This relationship had facilitated the PAP to become strong at the 
beginning and, hence, they converted to being an exclusively political hope for the people. 
In 1965, as PAP formed a government with a multi-ethnic alliance, the evolution 
of the PAP became instrumental in achieving the political sovereignty of Singapore. The 
PAP participated in its first election in 1955 in Singapore and won three out of the four 
seats, out of a possible 25 that were contested at the time; Lee won the poorest constituency 
in Singapore.88 In the 1959 election, the fully elective legislative Assembly of Singapore 
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established the government under the PAP.89 Lee became the first prime minister of 
Singapore in this Assembly. After the merger with Malaysia in 1963, the PAP expected to 
expand its power within the Malayan peninsula. Therefore, the PAP started to expand its 
party domination by propagating the democratic socialist idea supported by the populace 
that all ethnicities should be treated equally, which was a departure from traditional politics 
that formed exclusively around ethnicity or religious bases.90 The PAP’s action increased 
the popular support of the PAP, which became one of the reasons for the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Finally, Singapore became an independent and 
sovereign state in 1965 under the PAP government. 
2. Merging with Malaysia 
The leadership of PAP and the political alliances of the Chinese elite communities 
throughout the peninsula created the political impetus for the merger of Singapore with 
Malaysia in 1963. Singapore never desired independence as a single nation from the 
British; Singapore joined with Malaysia to fight against the colonial regime, demanding a 
new Malayan nation.91 Singaporean leaders—PAP leaders—also believed that if they did 
not merge with Malaysia, they would not experience economic progress.92 Only the pro-
communist wing of the PAP disagreed with the merger.93 The linkage developed by the 
Chinese elites in Malaysia and Singapore—as the major portion of the economy of both 
countries was held in the hands of Chinese elites—had been a key factor in helping 
Singapore to become an integral part of Malaysia.94 The elites believed the merger to be a 
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supportive measure for their business matters, because of the geographical position of 
Singapore.95 The trading post that was established around the Singapore port by the 
colonial rulers was vital for the Malayan elites while the inland raw material supply became 
a key requirement for Singapore’s elites. The Singapore and Malaysia merger happened 
after Singapore signed an agreement with Malaysia along with the people of Sabah and 
Sarawak.96 The merger was effected amid fanfare on all sides in 1963.  
A year after the signing of the merger agreement, Singapore had not received the 
expected linkage from Malaysia for its economic development. The merger was a response 
to the total release of Singapore from British Crown control in 1963.97 There were three 
underlying reasons for the merger agreement with Malaysia: find possible solutions to 
enhance economic progress through linkage, address security concerns that could arise 
after British departure, and mitigate Singapore’s insecurity about standing as an 
independent state. A major expectation for the merger agreement was to enhance the 
economic linkage, which both countries had enjoyed under the British rule and wished to 
expedite. The lack of an initial response to the agreement from Malaysia led the PAP to 
demand representation in the federal assembly in Malaysia.98 Additionally, Singaporean 
Chinese, the majority contributors to Singapore’s economy, grew increasingly unhappy 
with Malaysia’s demands for higher revenue from Singapore after signing the agreement.99 
Finally, the weak economic linkage and political resistance became key reasons for the 
failure of the merger agreement. 
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3. Separation from Malaysia and Sovereignty  
The increased political tensions between both countries led to Singapore’s separation 
from Malaysia.100 Indeed, Lee accused Malaysian leader Abdul Rahman one year after the 
agreement signed of being a “traitor” for not carrying out the merger agreement’s promised 
actions.101 The political tensions between the PAP and UMNO were growing. The PAP’s 
demand for representation within the federal assembly of Malaysia was rejected by the MCA 
and the UMNO.102 This misunderstanding between the political leadership and political 
parties became a key factor for the separation. Finally, in 1965, the leader of the UMNO, 
Abdul Rahman, decided to separate from Singapore and obtained a unanimous vote (126–0) 
in parliament to support the decision—without the presence of any representation of 
Singapore.103 Malaysia’s decision marked the beginning of Singapore as a sovereign and 
independent state from 1965; hence, Singapore decided to stand on its own in 1965. 
 THE PAP STATE 
Lee Kuan Yew converted Singapore to one of the most successful nations in the 
world. In the 1970s, American multinational companies invested large amounts of money 
in Singapore for their electronic and other industries. The PAP government and Lee made 
all possible attempts104 to attract foreign investors to Singapore; they even received 
Japanese investment, too. Between 1960 and 1990, under the leadership of Lee, Singapore 
experienced its highest economic growth.105 W.G. Huff elaborates that the “engine of 
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growth” during this period happened due to three changes: first, diversification of the 
economy through manufacturing and services; second, growth of new public entrepreneurs 
and multinational enterprises; and third, government commitment to and highly effective 
planning for, economic development.106 Singapore’s manufacturing share increased from 
16.6 percent in 1960 to 20.3 percent in 1967, and finance and business increased by 1.5 
percent during the same period.107 Hence, the policies introduced by the leadership and 
the PAP government became more recognized among the people of Singapore. The 
Western investments and presence of multinational enterprises in Singapore are good 
examples of how linkage became very visible in the initial several years after Singapore’s 
independence. 
Lee said that he had three concerns regarding Singapore’s development: one, to 
“get international recognition for Singapore;” two, to defend the peace of the land; then, 
lastly and importantly, to improve the economy. He successfully transformed Singapore 
into a better state as well as a stronger country in the region, both politically and 
economically. Lee established the Economic Development Board (EDB) under his direct 
control to look into matters of economic development, especially to attract foreign 
investors.108 The strategy of Lee was to attract European and American multinational 
companies to invest in Singapore. Finally, Singapore had investments from a considerable 
number of American multinational companies and they brought advanced technology in 
large scale operations that also created many jobs in Singapore.109 Lee added that 
American multinational companies attract foreign investors by establishing infrastructure, 
equity in participation in industry, and good labor relations.110 These investments further 
reinforced the linkage as well as the leverage that ensured the PAP government continued 
with the same policies. Thereby Lee was able to win the hearts and minds of the people as 
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his strategy could establish a wealthy society. Hence, he is considered as the father of the 
Nation by the people of Singapore. 
1. Democratic Control of Military 
Lee Kuan Yew was instrumental in maintaining good civil-military relations, which 
helped Singapore avoid military coups. Singapore has a Citizen Army, which is formed 
from the best people out of the entire male population, who get military training as a 
compulsory requirement. The PAP government recruits the best student cadets to the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), and they receive further specialized training abroad in 
their fields of talent. These talented and well-trained military personnel have an option of 
transferring to the national administrative sector for their own betterment, which in turns 
helps the country’s development process. All military personnel have better opportunities 
to advance their talents and the government does its best to keep the military up-to-date 
with necessary developments in parallel to the other regional armies. Hence, the PAP 
government has been able to maintain appropriate democratic civilian control over its 
military in Singapore; Lee has also ensured the development of the military with necessary 
resources to make them professional as a bureaucratic institution under his control. This 
professionalization has created job security both for military members who rise in the ranks 
during their career and for those who transition to the civilian sector.111 
2. Civil Service 
Effective control of the civil service has also been one of the PAP’s key factors in 
its governing system. The biggest challenge for the PAP government in 1969 was the fact 
that the loyalty of the civil servants was to the other political parties operating under the 
Malayan Federation.112 To produce better results, the government implemented reforms 
to the structure and procedures that civil servants had been practicing. Therefore, one of 
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the successes of the PAP regime was that it created trusted and efficient bureaucratic 
institutions through the reformation. The reformation of the civil service aimed to develop 
a strong bureaucratic relationship between the PAP government and its function. After the 
reform, the public sector attracted the most qualified and effective people who would also 
be loyal to the government. Further, the government changed the recruitment process and 
promotions schemes by converting to a merit-based system.113 The government had full 
control over the civil servants and bureaucratic institutions through this reformation 
process. These innovations have enabled the PAP government to continue with their 
political aim of economic development and minimize the resistance of bureaucratic 
institutions.  
 SOCIAL POLICY 
The modernization of society amid Western linkage and leverage became one of 
the crucial factors that the PAP government has addressed effectively. Unification of 
society under one concept that makes all equal under the term “Singaporean” became very 
challenging within the multicultural environment. The PAP government’s multilingualism 
policy under the social engineering program offered a successful solution to unify the 
country. Society became more dynamic and democratic through the linkage and leverage 
of multinational industries and prolonged exposure to people and ideas from the democratic 
West. 
Housing became one of the issues emerging from urbanization due to the Western 
linkage developed within the society. The PAP government introduced a housing program 
as a solution for the needs of the society.114 The establishment of the Housing 
Development Board in 1960 resulted in the rapid clearance of slums and the resettlement 
of squatters, which had become demands of the modern society.115 This change was a 
result of economic prosperity; therefore, liberalized culture became common in Singapore 
and people became independent like those living in modern developed democracies. 
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Hence, as explained by Dahl, the society of new generation became modernized with the 
features of a modern dynamic society, which consists of characteristics similar to the 
society in a democracy.116 This social change began a “new life” for most of the people, 
and the youth culture reflected its similarities to Western counterparts.117  
 THE MIDDLE-CLASS EXPANSION  
The rise of the middle class happened due to the Western linkage, which increased 
the democratic demands of the people and kept the PAP government under threat. The 
incremental growth of the middle class in Singapore was observed during the first 
industrialization process of the PAP government.118 Western linkage was continually 
appearing within Singapore society. Though the PAP government spurred economic 
progress, the expansion of the middle class posed a threat to the government. Middle-class 
demands on government policies and related to the cost-of-living became a critical factor 
for the opposition to win several constituencies.119 The demand for social and 
organizational change became notable among the other democratic features of Singapore’s 
middle class. In response to the expansion of the middle class and its demands, opposition 
parties became stronger than ever in the 1991 elections. Therefore, the middle class and its 
demands shackled the PAP government and its leaders. The PAP, however, regained the 
super majority in the following election, applying its political force to the opposition’s 
voter base.120  
The middle class was frustrated by some government policies, such as strict control 
of chewing gum and the high cost of living.121 In 1991, the opposition parties had four 
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members—out of 40 contests—in Parliament, the best results ever.122 The PAP became 
alarmed and started to threaten the voters of the failed constituencies, as well as the 
bureaucrats of those constituencies, for supporting the opposition candidates.123 William 
Case explains that the PAP threatened those voters, saying that if they did not “support the 
government they will be suspended from the housing program.”124 The voters were 
frightened of losing these government privileges.125 In response, the government 
established ministerial listening campaigns to meet people and acquire firsthand 
information.126  
1. Multilingualism 
The language of learning became English in most public schools; therefore, most 
Singaporeans are bilingual.127 Thus, every Singaporean of any ethnic group can speak one 
common language—English—and share their ideas through this common language. This 
bilingual program instituted by the PAP became very successful and enabled the PAP to 
win the hearts and minds of every ethnic group and retain its strong power within Singapore 
politics.128  
The PAP government conducted a broader “Social Engineering Program” to unite 
the multiethnic groups within Singapore. It took nearly a decade and a half to see the 
results.129 This program was one of the main reasons why Singapore was able to maintain 
such social harmony and order. Though this concept has maintained social harmony, it has 
strengthened the trust of the people in the PAP regime to continue as the non-threatening 
governing party with a super majority within Parliament. 
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2. Unified Singapore 
The PAP government established stable sovereignty by unifying Singapore under 
a single national identity among a population composed of the major ethnicities of Chinese, 
Malayans, and Indians. Singapore, although having a dominant ethnic Chinese majority, 
since independence has been able to maintain very good ethnic harmony among other 
ethnic communities, unlike Malaysia.130 The PAP constitutionally declared that Malayans 
and Indians would have equal status with the Chinese majority in all aspects of their day-
to-day life.131 The PAP government has maintained a heathy and successful ethnic 
harmony through appropriate government policies.132 For instance, public holidays were 
calendared equally among all the religious groups.133  
The ruling Chinese elites of PAP had the task of constructing a unified national 
identity that was unique to Singapore society.134 The government of Singapore has ensured 
that each ethnic group enjoys equal rights in electoral politics, education, the military, and 
public ceremonies considered as national events.135 Later, in 1989, the PAP merged the 
three major ethnicities existing in Singapore into one entity, designated by academic circles 
as “CMIO”—”Chinese,” “Malay,” “Indians,” and “Other”—which allowed all 
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Singaporeans to be represented under one common name.136 The government’s careful 
management of interracial issues has led Singapore to maintain a peaceful society.137 The 
efforts of the PAP to represent every ethnic group equally have supported the PAP and 
enabled the party to retain its status as a strong single political party.  
 ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Economic transformation, particularly in the manufacturing sector, has provided 
both leverage and linkage with the world’s democracies while making democratization 
more or less inevitable in the Singaporean case. For one thing, those democratic institutions 
that had been functioning during the colonial rule were, in turn, indispensable to PAP’s 
policy of economic development.  
1. City Development 
Singapore’s famous shopping city called “Maxwell Road” provides one indicator 
of the city-state’s economic development.138 Maxwell Road’s downtown is home to 
skyrise buildings, foreign investors’ office complexes, and trading buildings from every 
sector. Most of the multistoried offices, shopping malls, and apartment buildings in the 
Singapore city were built between 1970 and 1973.139 Similarly, Clyde Terrace Market 
expanded even beyond the land perimeter through construction into the sea, which also 
took place in the same era.140 These rapid developments needed several linkages with the 
Western powers. EDB, under Lee’s leadership, appointed the most effective intellectuals 
who had been educated in Western countries to deal with these entrepreneurs.141 The PAP 
government facilitated these investors by developing “well-planned industrial estates” and 
creating advanced and modern trading cities. The city development took place mainly due 
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to the rapid investments by Western powers, such as investors of America and Europe.142 
These developments further strengthened the Western linkage and attracted more investors. 
2.  Industrialization 
The manufacturing industries established in Singapore by developed and 
industrialized countries influenced people to form a modern society, which has the 
potential, at least, to develop internal pressure toward democratization. The highest and 
most rapid labor population growth seen in Singaporean history occurred from 1957 to 
1970, at a rate of 4.4 percent, which included minimal migratory surplus.143 The census 
report says that in 1957, Singapore had close to a half-million labor population and it 
increased to just over one million in 1970, but in 1990 it was 1.5 million.144 Manufacturing 
employment in 1967 was close to 60,000; in 1973 it was 200,000, and it was 350,000 in 
1990. Hence, this rapid labor population growth was a contributing factor reducing the 
unemployment rate. However, the unemployment rate increased with the relative decline 
in the agricultural sector due to urbanization as well as the fall in demand for rickshaw 
pullers due to motorized transport.145  
This rapid labor force growth had been addressed through the industrialization 
process of Singapore because it was one of the main concerns of Lee as well.146 His 
intention was to have all the skilled jobs filled by Singaporeans. Therefore, a substantial 
segment of the professional class became visible, expanding the middle class.147 The 
average income and wages of Singapore’s citizens became competitive within the 
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region.148 Singapore’s industrialization also helped foreign investors to dominate the 
manufacturing export industries.149 Hence, investors’ domination and the people’s 
exposure to working within the Western environment became conductive to Western 
linkage. 
Furthermore, the strong Western linkage allowed Singapore to overcome labor 
issues. Industrial wages in Singapore were highly competitive; for instance, the average 
pay per day in the Bata factory in Singapore was $1.36, whereas in China the same factory 
payed only $0.70.150 Huff states that Singaporean wages were close to wages of highly 
industrialized countries like the United Kingdom. This labor competition forced 
Singaporeans to advance their education, while only the most vital labor was recruited from 
the developed countries.151 Singapore was broadly approaching the international economy 
through highly skilled labor, becoming an economy based on human capital.152 People 
have to work hard to produce more than the expected target of investors. This factor has 
enabled Singapore to continue the same economic progress while becoming the strongest 
economic country in the region. Therefore, Singapore became more stable as its economy 
grew, and investors were also happy with the progress. 
3. Managing Migrant Labor 
Mass immigration of labor took place in Singapore during this era; however, those 
laborers were controlled for non-skilled jobs as much as possible or were minimally 
allowed for skilled jobs.153 A major part of immigrant labor was utilized for hawking, 
rickshaw driving, and domestic services, freeing the homegrown labor force to pursue 
highly skilled and professional jobs.154 Labor productivity is one of the main contributory 
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factors for economic growth; the PAP government established the Basic Economic 
Conversion Department under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to retain and redeploy 
redundant workers soon after the total withdrawal of the British.155 Therefore, the PAP 
was able to fill the skilled and unskilled labor requirements required with the economic 
progress.  
The people of Singapore were highly motivated through competitive wages and 
employment opportunities. The skilled labor market and the economy were carefully and 
appropriately managed by the government to maintain stability.156 Steady gross domestic 
product (GDP) of Singapore was on average around 6.5 percent up to 2000; however, it 
started to decline from 2001 and dropped to just over 4.5 percent in 2004.157 The main 
factor that could have been contributed to this decline in GDP was average labor 
productivity (ALP). The ALP was effectively managed by the PAP up to 2000, but it was 
declining from nearly 3.5 percent in 2000 to 2.5 percent in 2008.158  
4. The International Factor 
Multinational manufacturing and trading companies began to pressure the regime 
to maintain economic progress in Singapore since 2000. The GDP growth rate of Singapore 
was at 7.3 percent in 2000, but it dropped to 5.2 in 2006, recording the lowest ever 
figure.159 The size of Singapore’s foreign direct investment (FDI) was $5.4 billion in 2006, 
which was relatively high within the region.160 With Singapore’s GDP growth rate in 
decline, however, the government of Singapore took measures to increase labor 
                                                 
155 Lee, From Third World to First, 53. 
156 Jonathan Rigg, “Singapore and the Recession of 1985,” Asian Survey 28, no. 3 (1988): 49–51, 
https://doi/org.10.1525/as.1988.28.3.01p0149s. 
157 Khuong M. Vu, “Sources of Singapore’s Economic Growth‚ 1965–2008-Trends‚ Patterns and 
Policy Implications,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 28, no. 3 (December 2011): 319–320, 
https://doi/org.10.1355/ae28-3c. 
158 Figure 3 of the article on the “GDP and the ALP Growth Trends: Singapore vs. Hong Kong” 
explains the variation of GDP and ALP in Singapore. Vu, “Sources of Economic Growth,” 320. 
159 Vu, “Sources of Singapore’s Economic Growth‚” 326. 
160 Diana C. Robertson, “Corporate Social Responsibility and Different Stages of Economic 
Development: Singapore, Turkey, and Ethiopia,” Journal of Business Ethics 88, no. S4 (2009): 620, 625, 
doi: 10.1007/s10551-009-0311-x. 
35 
productivity. Other factors affecting GDP growth rate were that Singapore created minimal 
barriers for foreign investors, and its business laws rigorously enforced equality for both 
local and foreign investors. Therefore, it is confirmed that Singapore is being pressured to 
maintain its economic development under the declining rate of the GDP. Singapore’s 
leading manufacturing market shareholders are from the United States, such as ABB-
Global Digital Solution Center, Emerson, and Siemens USA are a few of them.161  
The base of the Singaporean economy has four basic categories: trade, 
transportation and communication, banking and financial services, and social services.162 
Further, Huff says that presently the main base of the Singaporean economy is services-
based development in the areas of information technology (IT), finance, business, and 
communications. Twenty percent of the GDP of the country is held by the manufacturing 
sector, which includes product and services.163 Further, having such large multinational 
companies has converted Singapore into an interdependent nation. This scenario, however, 
has expanded the linkage and leverage of the regime with Western investors and, after 
2000, the regime drifted into the most unstable authoritarianism, conditions that are highly 
favorable for democratization.  
 CONCLUSION 
Singapore has had only one strong political party, the PAP, since the country gained 
its independence. The economic development and social changes have been the two 
interdependent variables that have influenced the country’s ruling model. The ruling party, 
PAP, has become stronger and stronger with the economic success of the country. The 
stability created by the economic development of the Singapore enabled its transformation 
into a strong state under a strong political vision. In turn, the PAP earned popular support 
along with the country’s economic progress.  
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Singapore’s linkage with Western powers that had been developing from the time 
of colonial rule gave the country the strength to build and maintain democratic institutions. 
The multinational companies that have been investing within the Singapore have acquired 
a major portion of the Singapore’s economy. Since 2000, the PAP regime has faced two 
major issues challenging its supreme authority, which was built upon the economic 
progress of recent history. First, the resignation of Lee in 2001 from politics and then the 
unexpected decline in FDI challenged the PAP regime and its supreme authority. The party 
leadership had to accept some of the changes such as a change in their policies and 
governing behaviors to attract Western investors. Thereby, Western linkage and Western 
leverage have been highly influential not only on the regime and the society but on the 
democratic ruling model. 
The main objective of Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP government was to establish an 
economic development plan facilitated by the Western linkage. He was very strong on 
taking the initiative and setting up a plan for such economic development. The success of 
the economic development program further enhanced the Singaporeans’ trust in Lee and 
the PAP as their best choice for a regime.  
At the same time, Lee’s strategy to attract more Western investors became more 
successful. Several Western investors introduced industrialization and enabled Singapore 
to become industrialized. The Economic Development Board played a vital role in creating 
a strategy to attract investors. Selecting officers based on relevant education and 
qualification to coordinate with select Western countries is one good example of how Lee 
created successful economic and structural linkage with the Western powers. As a result of 
his strategy and policies, political opposition was drastically reduced and the average 
income in Singapore increased, further progressing Singapore’s economy. Lee Kuan Yew 
and his PAP government proved successful at establishing Singapore as a strong, 
prosperous—but not necessarily democratic—state. 
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III. RULING MODEL AND SINGAPORE POLITICS 
Democratization in Singapore has not progressed far, even under the influence of 
Western linkage and leverage, because the regime’s power was relatively very high from 
the start—and its interest in advancing democratization past a certain point has been 
relatively low. Though linkage and leverage have remained present, the strong leadership 
and political power of the PAP government have minimized their significance. The PAP 
government, which operated as the sole political party, maintained supreme power within 
the parliament and has remained in power since independence. In this way, the leadership 
of Lee Kuan Yew and the power of the PAP government has threatened or at least hindered 
democratization, even as they created rapid and stable economic progress, converting 
Singapore to a strong state.164  
Although the PAP government’s strategy and performance solidified its strength as 
a political party and regime, its resulting dominance became destructive to the 
democratization process. Lee’s leadership and the PAP’s policy developed a super-
majority within Parliament and because the people were content with the economic 
outcome of this political dominance, they initially had little motivation to change the 
situation. Lee’s influence and his leadership became key factors for such political 
supremacy and may bode poorly for Singapore’s democracy. Hence, this chapter explores 
the four basic topics of Singapore’s political system, leadership transition, ruling model, 
and regime after Lee Kuan Yew to discuss how Lee’s leadership and PAP party policy 
came to impede democracy in Singapore.  
 POLITICAL SYSTEM 
This section provides information on Singapore’s political beginnings as a 
democratic parliamentary system and its transformation to the single party dominant 
government. The PAP’s domination with a super majority has suppressed representation 
of the opposition to a minimum.  
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1. Parliamentary System 
In theory, Singapore follows the Westminster parliamentary system; in practice, it 
deviates from this format in significant ways.165 In the Westminster system, which consists 
of simple plurality or a “first-past-the-post” electoral system,166 each voter is allowed to 
vote for one candidate and whoever receives the most votes among all candidates will 
win.167 According to Bilveer Singh, the strict party discipline of the PAP and its full 
domination in the parliament unbalance the equilibrium in decision-making. In 1968, 
Singapore had 58 constituencies with 65 elected candidates, but in 2001, it had 115 elected 
candidates from only 24 constituencies.168  
The Singapore Election Department website further indicates that the parliament 
consists of three types of candidates: elected parliament members (MP), non-constituency 
MPs (NCMP) and Nominated MPs (NMP). The elected MPs come from single-member 
constituencies (SMC)—only one elected candidate from a constituency—and group 
representation constituencies (GRC)—multiple candidates will be elected from one 
constituency. These changes and variations to the Westminster system indicate that 
Singapore is not fully aligned with the Westminster democratic model.169 The changing 
nature of the electoral system and candidature nomination from a single constituency has 
created a unique parliamentary system in Singapore. 
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2. Election System
Singapore’s election system has diverged from its British colonial origins, 
becoming a GRC to maintain PAP supremacy. Singapore has two main types of elections: 
Presidential and Parliamentary, which deviates from the British Westminster system.170 
The Parliamentary election includes the general elections and by-elections. 
The Parliament has a term of 5-years but may be dissolved at any time 
before the expiry of its 5-year term by the President on the advice of the 
Prime Minister. The general election must be held within 3 months of the 
dissolution of the Parliament. By-elections are held when the seat in 
Parliament for a Single Member Constituency (SMC) is vacated or when all 
Members of Parliament (MPs) for a Group Representation Constituency 
(GRC) vacate their seats.171 
The creation of a GRC shows how the PAP has manipulated the democratic election 
system handed down from the British. The nature of the GRC ensures the PAP’s victory in 
elections in that it creates unfair competitive advantage against the opposition by creating 
more representative positions just prior to elections. Opposition parties cannot organize 
and propose more representative candidates in a short period of time, whereas the PAP has 
planned for such a contingency.  
The presidential election was introduced to Singapore politics in 1991; the office 
was previously a nominal appointment by the parliament.172 Article 20 (1) of the 
constitution indicates that the president of Singapore has a six-year term with no limit on 
re-election; however, article 19 B guarantees that one ethnicity shall not hold the 
presidency for more than five consecutive terms.173 The change to a public election for 
president was simply a democratic gesture with no real democratic impact because it is the 
prime minister who holds the executive power within the Parliamentary System in 
Singapore.  
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The PAP’s supremacy as the single strong governing party has prevented 
opposition parties from exercising any real power, which has negatively influenced 
democracy. During the period from 1969 to 2001, with the exception of the 1972 election, 
the PAP was the strongest and most domineering party in the parliament, while the 
opposition had a minimal number of elected members, as Table 1 illustrates.174  













1963 38 - 13* - 51 
1968 58 86.7 - - 58 
1972 65 70.4 - - 65 
1976 69 74.1 - - 69 
1980 75 77.7 - - 75 
1984 77 64.8 01 - 78 
1988 80 63.2 01 2 81 + 2 
1991 77 61.0 04 - 81 
1997 81 65.0 2 1 83 + 1 
2001 82 75.3 2 1 83 + 1 
2006 82 66.6 2 1 84 + 1 
2011 81 60.1 6 3 87 + 3 
2015 83 69.9 6 3 89 + 3 
*By this time, there was a political coalition with Malaysia and some British-backed political
alliances. 
The PAP introduced the NCMP system after 1984 to maintain the nominal 
balancing of opposition within the parliament.176 Those non-constituency parliament 
members chosen from a party or parties did not belong to the governing party.177 
Introduction of this system enabled Singapore to create a theoretically balanced democratic 
parliament. Moreover, it may have been a driving factor for encouraging Western 
economic linkage. 
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The NCMP system was meant to fulfill democratic requirements without enforcing 
them practically. However, in the 1991 election, the NCMP system threatened the 
government because opposition domination increased to a record number; the PAP was not 
happy with this rising pattern of the opposition. Hence, Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP applied 
a new strategy to win.178 William Case states that the government made a sudden and 
surprising change to the electoral system after 1991 (Table 1), using the strategy of adding 
more group representative constituencies than in previous elections.179 
The new strategy of the government reduced the opposition representation to one 
seat in the 1997 election, but the opposition had three seats in 1991. The PAP’s strength 
and domination in the parliament enable the party to gain approval for such an electoral 
change with no resistance, facilitating one of the PAP’s most successful victories against 
the opposition parties.180 Therefore, Case further argues that Singapore has some features 
of “pseudo-and semi democracies of new order,” like certain other Southeast Asian 
countries.181 These new strategies have enabled the PAP to dominate the parliament with 
a super-majority. 
 LEADERSHIP TRANSITION 
The PAP has experienced leadership transition, but has managed to continue with 
roughly the same form of governing model until 2004. Lee Kuan Yew served as the first 
prime minister of Singapore until 1990.182 His successor was Goh Chok Tong, who served 
from 1990 to 2004.183 Lee Hsien Loong—Lee Kuan Yew’s son—is now the third prime 
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minister of Singapore.184 After stepping down, the elder Lee continued to serve in the 
parliament as senior minister and the minister mentor until 2001.185  
Goh Chok Tong was a more open-minded and liberal leader than Lee Kuan Yew, 
but Goh’s government continued as an authoritarian regime. As prime minister, Goh 
perpetuated the same features of authoritarianism that Lee Kuan Yew’s government 
exercised.186 The initial statements of Goh redefined the PAP government policy as a 
“trusteeship with a more consultative, participatory and a more human side of government 
to create a more gracious society and a kinder and gentle nation.”187 He acted under the 
influence of linkage and leverage, and allowed the opposition a potential to gain 
legitimacy.188 Yet, he returned to the authoritarian strategies of the PAP government, due 
to the significance of Lee Kuan Yew’s presence in the parliament, and had successful runs 
in the 1997 and 2001 elections.  
Lee Hsien Loong is the eldest son of Lee Kuan Yew and he has also maintained the 
success of the PAP. The highest number of elected opposition members appeared in the 
parliament (six out of 90 seats), however, became possible under Lee Hsien Loong’s 
government, which is a good indication that Singapore is becoming more democratic 
(Table 1). Previously, Singapore never had more than two or three opposition seats in the 
parliament. Therefore, the variation of the ruling model after 2011 is significant (Table 1). 
The new regime is under the strong influence of linkage and leverage.  
 RULING MODEL 
The ruling model of the PAP government exhibits a combination of democratic and 
nondemocratic behaviors. The suppression of political rights, the rights of the people, the 
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media and the right of expression have been practiced while minority rights were also 
exercised, making Singapore an example to the region.  
1. Political Rights 
The contradictory definition of the governing process within the constitution helped 
the PAP government’s monopolization of legal procedure, which, in turn, has restricted 
political rights. The Singapore courts tend to defer to the political agendas of those who 
appointed them.189 The government makes the judicial appointments, creating political 
bias in the nominees, which leads to monopolization of power by the government.190 For 
example, Lee Kuan Yew appointed his longtime friend and family lawyer Lai Kew Chai 
as a High Court Bench; later, the U.S. State Department and the Human Rights organization 
Asia Watch made accusations of the political prejudice of the court system, which 
substantiated this politicization.191 Lai Kew Chai’s nomination became controversial 
within Singapore’s legal fraternity as he had not been practicing law for more than 20 years 
and was doing business in Singapore. The case of Ranjeevan v. Public Prosecutor (1998) 
explained the confrontation with the execution and protection of constitutional provisions 
regarding the necessary privileges of a person to seek counsel before or after he is arrested; 
but the court declined to provide such an ancillary right to Ranjeevan in his case, stating 
that: 
Any proposition to broaden the scope of the rights accorded to the accused 
should  be addressed in the political and legislative arena. The Judiciary, 
whose duty is to ensure that the intention of Parliament as reflected in the 
Constitution and other legislation is adhered to, is an inappropriate 
forum.192 
Further Beng-Huat Chua says that Article 9(3) of the constitution contains the 
provisions for such an instance but the court remained rigid on their original decision, 
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which in turn had been one of the instances that explained how the judicial system was 
biased toward the PAP.193 Therefore, this evidence proved how the PAP government 
steered the legal system and monopolized it under the umbrella of a polyarchal system.  
2. Civil Liberties 
The unclear interpretation of the people’s rights in the constitution and legal system 
has led the Singaporean population to accept the government’s viewpoint rather than 
expressing opposing ideas. The enforcement of the Society Act and the Internal Security 
Act overrule some of the liberties and freedoms provided to the people of Singapore by the 
constitution.194 The Civil Society Act restricts people from constructing coalitions of 
oppositional or antigovernment forces.195 The Jayarathnam Johua Benjamin V. Lee Kuan 
Yew case in 1992, explains that right to freedom of speech allowed by Article 14(1) (a) 
does not protect all speech. Because in another section of the same article, article 14(2) (a) 
says that the right conferred by article 14(1) (a) does not facilitate for any civilian to violate, 
defame or incite against the parliament.196 Therefore, article 14(2) (a) has empowered 
parliament to limit many civil rights and force the consensus of the people in the PAP.  
 Local Media  
The government of Singapore has always possessed strict control over all media 
agencies. Almost all the radio and television networks have been state-owned enterprises 
while government-associated elites have owned several newspaper organizations.197 The 
media corporation of Singapore (Mediacorp)—government owned broadcasting and 
television cooperation—and the publicly owned television channel, which is highly 
commercialized in nature, have held total domination over the all-telecasting channels 
                                                 
193 Lim, Lee, and Lee. 
194 Chua, Liberalism Disavowed, 67. 
195 Chua, 67–68. 
196 Lim, Lee, and Lee, Singapore: Negotiating State and Society, 18. 
197 Chua, Liberalism Disavowed, 38–39. 
45 
within Singapore.198 Later, Mediacorp took the control of the Singaporean publicly owned 
newspaper, Today. The newspaper organizations are not under government control but 
have been strictly censored through government agencies and laws. The Singapore news 
industry is controlled by Singapore Press Holding (SPH), which is not a government-
owned company; however, the management board of SPH has “special management shares 
with special voting rights” nominated by the Ministry of Information and Arts.199  
Another example of how the Singapore government keeps control of the news 
agencies is its practice of arresting editors or writers under the Internal Security Act. There 
is abundant evidence of such actions by the PAP government, but two examples soon after 
the enactment of Internal Security Act in 1971 are particularly well known. First, there was 
the arrest of Shamsuddin Tung Tao Chang, the editor-in-chief of the Muslim-Chinese 
newspaper, which later merged with the SPH. The other example was the arrest of Ly 
Singko, senior editorial writer of the Mandarin newspaper.200 Both were accused of 
publishing and expressing anti-government ideas. Information control has been one of the 
key policies of the PAP government, which continued throughout the period of economic 
development.201  
 International Media   
The government has been highly sensitive to international media agencies as well. 
Furthermore, local writers, who are strictly censored, have been discouraged from writing 
articles for these international publications. The government particularly believes that 
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international publications will impede economic progress. As reported on the Research 
Gate website, “Most repressive of all is the Internal Security Act, bequeathed by the British 
and still in active use today.”202 The article notes that the Singaporean government sued 
the International Herald Tribune in 1987 for publishing the article “Dynastic Politics” by 
Philip Christopher,203 a visiting lecturer at the National University of Singapore.  
In 1977, two Singaporean writers were detained for writing article in “Far Easter 
Economic Review, a Hong Kong-based weekly publication.204 Cherian George calls the 
Singaporean government’s actions “dictatorial” as regards mass media and information 
flows.205 Indeed, the government’s prime objective has been to keep the media under 
control without hampering the economic progress. 
3. Multiracialism  
The PAP government has also effectively controlled the performing arts and theater 
to protect the Singaporean culture through a “multiracial model” and to achieve its political 
interests. The strict censorship enforced by the PAP illustrates their desire to protect a 
multiracial model that allows interaction between different ethnic groups.206 The 
enactment of the Internal Security Act has ensured the protection of the social unity themes, 
multiracialism, and the culture of Singapore since 1976.207 The dominant television 
broadcasting company, the Media Corporation of Singapore, has followed government 
agenda and has broadcast their programming in both English and Chinese.208 George also 
states that most of the censoring methods of the government have restricted editors and 
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journalists as well as autonomy within their profession.209 His survey found that editors 
and newsroom supervisors are influenced by external politics, with political authorities 
exercising the most significant limits.210 The government’s behind-the-scene influence has 
been a critical factor in gearing the media toward the official political interests. 
4. Protection of Minorities 
Recognition of minority interests was effectively considered within Singapore’s 
constitution, which protects the right of each citizen. Even though Singapore follows the 
Westminster parliamentary system, it has a written constitution that has been in effect since 
August 1965.211 The Singapore constitution explains the various forms of fundamental 
liberties—such as the individual’s liberty, rights in respect to education, and freedom of 
religion—which are protected under Part IV.212 It further guarantees the equal treatment 
and protection of any person in article 12(1).213 Also, article 16 (10) prohibits 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, religion, descent, or place of 
birth.214 The constitution provides special provisions for the fundamental rights of 
minorities under article 152; also the constitution provides for various institutions to protect 
minorities.215 According to Minority Rights Group International, Singapore’s government 
shows a very positive approach to minorities and their protection.216 It further says that 
Singapore’s constitution and government policies are adequate to treat minorities as 
compared to other countries in the world. Judicial balancing also serves to protect 
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minorities, their district identities and interests.217 Therefore, individual rights and 
minority rights provide equal opportunity within Singapore and ensure that everyone is 
treated equally in terms of political and voting rights. 
 REGIME AFTER LEE KUAN YEW 
The parliament under Lee Hsien Loong’s leadership became more democratic than 
it had been during previous regimes. The strength of the opposition parties in the parliament 
provided a democratic start. The PAP under Lee Kuan Yew, though, had no opposition 
until 1981.218 The first opposition party member was not elected to the parliament until 
the 1984 parliamentary election.219 J. B. Jeyaretnam became the first opposition member 
of the Singapore Parliament and he represented Worker’s Party (WP) from the Anson 
electorate.220 Thereafter, the 1991 general election was the next turning point in 
Singapore’s parliamentary elections when four members for the parliament came from the 
opposition parties—three from the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) and one from the 
WP.221 The next milestone was when six members of the opposition won seats in the 2011 
parliamentary election, which was followed by the opposition securing their highest 
number of seats ever in the 2015 election.222 Presently Singapore’s parliament consists of 
90 total seats from 29 constituencies.223 The PAP government contested parliamentary 
elections with ten or more uncontested constituencies, but in the 2015 election all 
constituencies had more than two contested political parties.224 All these features are very 
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unique in the nature of Singapore’s politics. The considerable representation of the 
opposition in the parliament after 2011 explains the increase in the democratic functioning 
of Singapore’s parliament. 
 CONCLUSION 
Singapore’s government has mainly focused on achieving its objective of economic 
development at the expense of facilitating human liberties; hence, the PAP government had 
many non-democratic features. As Levitsky warns, authoritarian governments pursue their 
goals without paying much attention to the practical application of their policies toward 
humanity, including human rights and civil liberties.225 Lee Kuan Yew’s strategy was to 
maximize human capital to achieve the political objective of economic progress. He and 
his government primarily accelerated the process of industrialization through human skills.  
The PAP regime under Lee Kuan Yew became authoritarian, and Goh Chok Tong 
continued as an authoritarian because of Lee Kuan Yew’s influence as the senior minister 
within the parliament until 2004. The actions of the leadership and party policy developed 
to achieve a super majority within the parliament and dominated politics as the data in 
Table 1 earlier illustrated.226 Although Western linkage and leverage existed during 
colonial rule, which led to the creation of some democratic institutions such as the election 
office, political rights, and civil liberties, the PAP’s domination suppressed the efficiency 
of these institutions. Sudden changes in the election system just before the polling date and 
strict control of the information flow are examples of the PAP’s strategy to maintain 
domination within the political sphere. The PAP government’s manipulation of the 
political process always took place under the cover of democratic institutions. The PAP’s 
strategy was to allow Western linkage and leverage to exert an influence while the 
government’s political stability and power within the country enabled it to negotiate those 
democratic pressures without sacrificing domination.  
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 The PAP government’s supremacy and the authoritative leadership of Lee Kuan 
Yew ensure there was no resistance in the parliament. Therefore, developing even a minor 
resistance within the parliament was considered a loss for PAP domination. The continued 
and consecutive success the party enjoyed during several parliamentary elections 
developed into a pattern that they had to follow to maintain supreme power. Holding 
supremacy and not allowing the opposition to rise erodes democratic elements, as 
evidenced by PAP’s non-democratic approach to elections, the media, and the legal system. 
The party took control of every governing element and converted it to a central command 
structure. The development of such a situation created patrimonial bureaucracies and a 
feudal authoritative structure to resist democratic progress. Moreover, through careful 
control of information flows out of the country, the government also reduced the potential 
threat posed to the ruling model by the Western linkage. No one can find actual facts or 
figures about the Singapore regime. Because the government has controlled information 






IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATION, AND CONCLUSION 
Singapore is democratized in theory, but practically speaking, it is a stable 
authoritarian country. Singapore was given several democratic features under colonial rule 
that enabled the country to function theoretically within the democratic framework. The 
government continues to claim to uphold democratic institutions while operating within a 
central command governing structure—an authoritarian model. The PAP government has 
been enjoying its unrivaled power within Singapore politics since 1969. Over this period, 
this nature of Singapore politics has become ingrained within the culture, and society has 
grown accustomed to it, but there may be change with the new generation. Western linkage 
and leverage are still low in relation to the PAP’s power within the political realm. Since 
2004, though, there seems to have been slight improvements in terms of the opposition’s 
representation in Parliament and with regard to media freedom, but it has not been enough 
to challenge or threaten the authoritarian government. It has, however, caused what was a 
stable authoritarian regime to shift to an unstable one. This thesis has argued that the 
slightest reduction in authoritarian rule multiplies the effects of the democratization process 
due to Western linkage and leverage. The PAP government has more than 50 years’ 
experience in manipulating these democratic institutions and maintaining authoritarian 
rule. The next few elections will indicate whether Singapore is moving toward democracy 
or back to stable authoritarianism (refer to Figure 2). As the PAP shifts to its fourth 
generation of leadership, opposition domination and leadership transition will potentially 
impact the continuation of authoritarian rule in Singapore. 
Although Singapore’s economic and political history is unique and was established 
under authoritarian rule, its competitive authoritarian rule may have an important 
prescriptive value for other developing countries. The formation of the PAP was initiated 
by educated young Chinese elites in Singapore. At the time of its independence, 
Singapore’s Chinese population dominated the economy. The initial strength of the PAP 
was the strength of the Chinese elites and a majority of the Chinese population of the 
Malayan peninsula was settled in Singapore. These factors resulted in PAP’s domination 
until it achieved full control with a super majority as a democratically appointed 
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government in 1969. While these factors transformed the PAP government into a strong 
political party, Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP policy of economic development became very 
successful along with passage of time. Lee’s initiatives of organizing the government and 
the party policy of the PAP government led the country to achieve a stable economic 
development. The industrialization through foreign investment and the government’s 
emphasis on people improving productivity played a key role in the PAP party policy. 
These led the PAP government to secure a stable authoritarian regime. The PAP never 
wanted to lose its authority at any cost. The party has not wanted to see its power reduced; 
as an example, the PAP grew alarmed and changed its election strategy after seeing a slight 
increase in the number of opposition candidates who won seatsa total of fourin the 
1991 parliamentary election. Later, under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership and the PAP’s 
policy, the opposition was never allowed to rise. Hence, his authoritarian regime is unique 
among the regimes available in the world, and it is destructive for the civil liberties and 
human rights. 
 EVOLUTION OF AUTHORITARIANISM  
The ruling model of the PAP became an authoritarian one along with its domination 
in parliament and it economic achievement in 1969 (refer to Figure 3). The stable form of 
authoritarianism shifted to an unstable form, though, with the rise of the opposition after 
the 2011 elections and the minimal liberalization of Lee Husien Long’s government. 
1. Authoritarianism  
There are particular features of the ruling model of the PAP government that make 
it comparable to authoritarian rule. First, Levitsky and Linz identify that most authoritarian 
regimes have a single political party dominating the government.227 Media control and 
censorship is done entirely through a central command mechanism in Singapore, while the 
PAP government manipulates the legal system to apply very rigid mechanisms to control 
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people, forcing them to accept government policies at the expense of humanitarian 
practices. Through such practices, the PAP has implemented an authoritarian model of rule 
since the party took control of the parliament with a super majority in the 1969 election up 
to now.  
2. Stable Authoritarianism  
The strength of the PAP government referentially became more significant than the 
Western linkage, ensuring a stable authoritarianism. The government held a very strong 
position within Singapore politics, and Lee Kuan Yew provided strong leadership with a 
central command authority. Parliament and its committees, such as the Economic 
Development Board, as well as the legal system and the media were kept under his direct 
control. These features made Singapore organizationally very strong. When organizational 
power solidifies to neutralize the influence of Western linkage, stable authoritarianism 
results. Singapore’s Western linkage has several colonial legacies. The new industries that 
have invested in Singapore had some colonial legacies as well, and they are making good 
profits due to the productivity of the labor force. At the same time, investors did not get 
actual information about the non-democratic behavior of the PAP government as the 
government had strict control of the information flow and the media. The PAP regime has 
always manipulated things within the democratic framework, such as controlling the media 
either through government ownership of most of the media agencies, or by appointing the 
board of directors of private media agencies. Hence, the government has consistently 
managed the information flow within the democratic framework.  
Western powers may have been prevented from receiving vital information about 
the government’s behavior, but investors were satisfied with their business progress. By 
obtaining a super majority in the 1968 elections and achieving economic progress a year 
after their domination, the PAP government was able to become a stable authoritarian 
regime, as illustrated in Figure 3. Hence, the aforementioned evidence has proved that the 
authoritarianism practiced by the PAP government became stable due to the systematic 
handling of the Western leverage. 
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 POSSIBLE CHANGE 
Singapore has had to democratize because its economy is interdependent with the 
Western democracies and institutions. Singapore society is also Westernizing through 
technological advancements and social media. Nevertheless, Singapore’s constitution itself 
has been a democratic instrument that requires democratization to uphold and protect it. 
Hence, there are two possibilities available within Singapore to form a democratic 
government. First, change is required to the existing political regime—the PAP—and the 
other is to change the ruling model, the demand for which is an emerging social trend.  
 
 Influence of Western Linkage and Leverage in Relation to the 
Authoritarianism in Singapore.228  
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1. Regime Change 
The regime under Lee Hsien Loong from 2004 to present has become more 
vulnerable to Western leverage and linkage. As stated by Levitsky, when the organizational 
power of government declines and leverage increases, unstable authoritarianism 
emerges.229 This instability becomes an opportunity for democratization in a country. 
Singapore’s authoritarian behavior has been declining under Lee Hsien Loong. The 
lessened control of media and legal aspects within the new regime of the PAP implies a 
shift to unstable authoritarianism, which is a good sign for the democratization process. 
Yet, the continued single-party domination in the politics and the central command 
structure remain a challenge. The PAP’s political domination raises one question about 
Singapore politics: will the traditional political behavior in Singapore acclimate to change 
at least within the next ten years? 
2. Social Change 
Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP created economic progress and social development, 
which, in turn, reinforced the people’s acceptance of the authoritarian methods responsible 
for their sustainment. The PAP’s more than 50 years of authoritarian rule converted society 
and it values, always measuring things in relation to economic prosperity or gains and 
social comfort. Hence, the public worries less about politics and political conditions unless 
they see a threat to their social comfort. In turn, the PAP government did its best to maintain 
such conditions to keep the population happy. The improvement in living conditions and 
the modernization and sophistication of daily life provided by advanced technology are 
just a few examples. The Singaporean people have always liked to use new technology and 
equipment; however, sometimes this tendency may have had a circular effect on the regime 
as well. Lee Hsien Loong has had to release Internet and Facebook restrictions due to such 
an effect. The government strategy is still working, though, and continues to follow the 
authoritarian model. The natural changes taking place in the society will come very slowly 
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unless external factors, such as Western linkage and leverage, influence the authoritarian 
transition of the PAP.  
 DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION 
Singapore is fulfilling several democratic requirements in theory while keeping 
actual democracy at bay. Democratic requirements provide the measure of a government’s 
or governing model’s democratic behavior. “Equal right to vote, political rights of the 
people, free and fair elections, right to express, and protection” are the best selected 
requirements by which to evaluate the democracy of Singapore. The evaluation of the PAP 
ruling model and the governing system of Singapore against those elements will measure 
the true nature of the democracy in Singapore. Nonetheless, the PAP government, to ensure 
the sustainability of its regime, manipulates these democratic elements to its advantage. 
Therefore, this testing process further confirms that the PAP government manipulates the 
democratic elements to its advantage and to sustain its power.  
1. Right to Vote  
In Singapore’s first election, under British rule in 1948, only the select elite had the 
right to vote; the legislative council had only six elected members out of 22 members.230 
The first major accomplishment of voting rights was the general election in 1949 when all 
seats were elected.231 In 1969, Singapore had its own parliament under the PAP 
government, which was Singapore’s first achievement as a sovereign state and the citizens’ 
right to vote. To present, Singapore has held several general elections for its national 
assembly. All citizens 21 years or older holding a National Registration Identity Card have 
the right to vote. The question that remains is whether the right to vote exists primarily as 
a theoretical democratic element or as a practical facilitation of democratic freedom. The 
PAP government’s political pressure on citizens to discourage them from voting for 
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opposing parties deviates from democratic freedom. This behavior appeared after the 1997 
election. Threatening and imposing pressure on voters during the election campaign was a 
form of suppressing people’s right to select their own representatives. Therefore, the right 
to vote is not a democratic feature available under the PAP regime. During recent elections 
the incidence of voter suppression decreased somewhat; since 2011, there have been nine 
opposition members in the parliament, which is evidence of reduced voter suppression that 
allowed more opposition members to join the parliament.232  
2. Political Rights of the People  
After colonial rulers’ reconstruction of Singapore’s administrative system, it 
facilitated the people of Singapore exercising their political right through forming the first-
ever political party, Malayan Democratic Party in 1945. Thereafter, Singaporeans formed 
their own political party, the PAP, in 1954. Dahl and Tilly argue that there are two aspects 
of political rights: provision and securing of people’s right to hold office.233 In Singapore, 
the “right of the people to be elected”234 exists in theory, but election results have proved 
that it is not a democratic freedom in practice. The “protection of political rights” also 
exists in theory and is provided for legislatively, but in practice it is not visible.235 The fact 
that PAP was uncontested in every election during the first several elections and faced 
several electorates until 2001 suggests that the political right of the people has been 
suppressed. Having only one strong political party and the continuation of its rule with few 
opposition members in the parliament has given the PAP full control and enabled the party 
to manipulate the political rights of the people.  
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3. Free and Fair Elections 
The election office is an important element of democracy, and it was established 
under colonial rule. Singapore experienced its first legislative elections in 1955 and it first 
presidential elections in 1991.236 The president of Singapore holds several powers, like 
proposing an annual budget to the parliament, which deviates from the British system. 
Therefore, the election system is a mixture of presidential and parliamentarian systems. 
Singapore has Single Member Constituency, and Group Member Constituency within the 
electorates, and Non-Constituency Members and Nominated Members are nominated to 
the parliament. And, although elections in Singapore seem very methodical, free, and fair 
from the outside, the PAP has organized elections skillfully, changing the election systems 
at the last moment to ensure the opposition does not have time to change its strategy to 
win. Similarly, PAP’s changing the electoral constituency boundaries and converting the 
electoral system from Single Member Constituency to Group Member Constituency just 
before the elections is evidence that the election office also does not function freely as a 
democratic institution.  
The election office never rejected or opposed such strategic moves by the PAP 
government, hinting that the governing party influences the office. Whereas these non-
democratic strategies might typically meet resistance from voters, the majority of 
Singapore’s citizens were content with the PAP’s economic policies and country’s 
progress. Therefore, they were either disinterested or fearful to directly challenge or oppose 
the PAP’s political strategy. Yet, the younger generation of Singaporeans is now looking 
for democratic change along with the new policies of the present regime.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the new generation comes of age in Singapore and the liberalized nature of Lee 
Husien Long’s government continues, Singaporeans will have greater expectations for 
strengthening the democratization process of Singapore. Hence, this thesis proposes the 
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following recommendations under two underlining factors: international and external 
perspectives on the democratization of Singapore. 
1. International Perspective  
International actors must pay more attention to Singapore’s media control policy; 
they should influence the PAP regime to avoid such policy implementation. This new 
regime is the best time for the international community or Western powers to use their 
leverage to pressure Singapore to stop media control. Singapore has had a tendency of 
controlling media strictly; the regime under Lee Kuan Yew initiated such control and it has 
continued, but Lee Hsien Loong’s regime has shown some loosening of media control. 
Therefore, the present regime in Singapore is most likely the right time for the international 
community to push Singapore for liberalizing the media. 
Lee Hsien Loong is proposing a parliamentary reformation; hence, this is again the 
right time for Western powers to use their leverage to encourage the present government 
to reform the constitution and to avoid such authoritarian regimes. The reformation should 
focus on the areas that the PAP had mutilated to establish authoritarian rule. Such reforms 
should include liberalizing the legal and bureaucratic institutions to avoid the continued 
manipulation of these institutions in future. Further, the long-standing pattern of a central 
command structure should be dismantled and liberalized to the people’s advantage. 
More non-governmental organizations or humanitarian organizations that monitor 
human rights and civil liberties should be established within Singapore. Those 
organizations must use leverage to establish their officers in Singapore. If this is not 
possible, these organizations must provide more reports on the government’s authoritarian 
behavior and its efforts at voter suppression. Elections must be monitored closely and the 
entire world must be made aware of what is happening during elections in Singapore and 
during pre- and post-election situations. Humanitarian organizations must fund and educate 
social organizations and existing political parties in Singapore on the democratic way of 
doing things. The correct influence exerted on the correct people could provide better 
results from elections as well as in their aftermath.  
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2. Internal Perspective 
The Singapore government, opposition parties, and society have some 
responsibility to convert Singapore into a democracy. Protecting the democratic 
constitution and the interests of the economic stakeholders are vital to protecting 
democracy. Therefore, this thesis proposes the following recommendations to realize the 
democratization process in Singapore.  
Singapore should discard the Internal Security Act during the parliament 
reformation. The Internal Security Act is the most vital and dangerous component of 
Singapore politics that has converted the PAP government to an authoritarian model. The 
removal of the act can partially paralyze the PAP’s authoritarianism. The PAP government 
is mainly hanging on to the Internal Security Act to maintain its central command structure. 
This is very possible along with the parliamentary reformation proposed by Lee Hsien 
Loong.  
Singapore should hold a referendum/plebiscite to alter the election process: the 
prime minister of Singapore should be elected while the president should be appointed by 
the parliament. The existing process is the other way around, in which the president is 
elected and the prime minister is appointed by the parliament. The change to the political 
system would make a prime minister of Singapore directly liable to the entire population 
and enable the prime minister to represent the people of the country rather than representing 
a constituency to lead the country. Under such reforms, the possibility of having a prime 
minister and parliament from two different parties becomes high, which is a positive 
feature of a democratic government. 
The literature review and thesis analysis recommend that the people of Singapore 
should vote to replace the existing prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, in the next election 
with a more democratically minded person. Singapore’s regime is at a critical juncture and 
the country needs this change. Appointing a new prime minister who has a democratic or 
liberal mindset could easily promote the democratization process in Singapore. 
Furthermore, the improvement in the opposition’s representation in parliament since 2011 
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provides more strength to a new, more liberal-minded prime minister in Singapore so that 
the democratization process can be established, destabilizing the authoritarian model. 
Singapore’s government should uphold three important democratic values—
promotion of efficient civil servants, elimination of corruption, and protection of minority 
rights—which the government needs to maintain in the future, as these values are vital for 
modern developing democracies. Lee Kuan Yew’s first priority, it must be recalled, was to 
develop human capital to create a competitive advantage. Less financial corruption within 
the bureaucracy and protection of minority rights are very good values of the governing 
system that must be protected in the future government system.  
 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The most vital area for future studies would be in the field of political science. 
Research could include conducting a survey study on how to introduce a political system 
best suited for Singapore to satisfy the needs of the economic, political, and social factors 
and avoid the continuation of the authoritarian model. This survey can answer questions 
about the possibilities for changing the governing patterns of Singapore and the type of 
political system that will provide a government that is more democratic. These are only a 
few suggestions that one could study as thesis questions. A future study might also take the 
form of a survey to recommend structural changes to Singapore politics.  
 CONCLUSION 
This thesis traces the evolution of Singapore politics and influencing factors to the 
democratization process. The evolution of Singapore politics started with democratic 
elements and through the democratic process. Singapore politics became authoritarian in 
nature with the country’s independence and it became a stable authoritarian type after the 
PAP gained a super majority in the parliament in 1969. The PAP government continued as 
a stable authoritarian regime throughout recent history to date. Therefore, social changes 
and economic conditions became the causal factors of Singapore’s regime type while Lee 
Kuan Yew and PAP party policy became the root cause of it. Nonetheless, the nature of 
the authoritarian regime in Singapore has shown significant change in its model since 2011, 
after receiving nine opposition members into its parliament. The new regime under Lee 
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Hsien Loong has shown incremental liberalization with his policies loosening controls on 
the media. In retrospect, the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and PAP policy became the most 
destructive factors that eroded the democratization process in Singapore. Therefore, the 
most influential factors affecting the democratization process of Singapore are social and 
economic factors, which have had both positive and negative effects due to the root causes 
of Lee Kuan Yew and PAP policy. 
Finally, the evidence proves that the PAP government became a stable authoritarian 
regime due to two factors: the influence of the majority of the Chinese Malayan community 
and rapid economic progress. The Chinese population and Chinese-educated representation 
in the PAP government, including Lee Quan Yew, played a vital role in converting the 
PAP government to a stable authoritarian model. The unexpected success of the economic 
program became the other factor enabling the PAP to become an authoritarian regime. 
Although the people of Singapore had a long-standing expectation of having a higher 
standard of living, they had lacked a plan or program to achieve such economic progress. 
Finally, Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership allowed the country to achieve such success, which, 
in turn, enabled the PAP to become the strongest party in Singapore’s political sphere. If 
the PAP had not achieved such economic progress, the country would have developed a 
much different political climate and economic capacity. Yet, since the 2011 election, the 
amber light is on in Singapore politics, and the next couple of elections will surely prove 
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